In this paper we make a detailed comparison of the Situation Calculus and the Event Calculus, two logic-based temporal reasoning formalisms. We concentrate on di erences between the calculi, considering the similarities su ciently indicated in the recent literature. We illustrate the inability of Event Calculus to handle counterfactual reasoning problems, and that of Situation Calculus to deal with counterfactual statements in the presence of actions with nondeterministic e ects. We present a new calculus which extends both Situation and Event Calculus. In this new calculus we de ne a natural and clear relation between situations and time points, which di ers from those used in previous comparisons. We show the relation of this new calculus to both original calculi. We compare the original calculi using the new calculus as an analysis tool.
INTRODUCTION
The Situation Calculus ( 17] ) and the Event Calculus ( 16] ) are two well-known formalisms for representing temporal domains. The original versions of the two formalisms were created with di erent goals in mind and have a rather di erent ontology.
Central to Event Calculus is the notion of action occurrences, or events, at certain points in time. These events determine time intervals during which certain uents hold. In the original Event Calculus these time intervals are explicitly represented, though in later simpli ed versions they are only implicitly available.
In Situation Calculus the basic notions are actions and situations. A situation corresponds to a snapshot of the world at an instant of time. This has been interpreted in a number of di erent ways, e.g. in 20] situations are considered to be (hypothetical) periods of time between two actions. In 14] situations are assumed to correspond to time points rather than time periods. In 2] a situation is seen as simply the set of uents that holds at a certain instant in time. In this paper we adopt the view of situations as time periods. The set of uents that holds at an instant in time will be called the state of the world at that instant. Actions are the cause of situation transitions: a result function is used to map (action,situation) pairs to the new situation resulting from the execution of that action in that situation.
Although the original versions of the two formalisms did not look very much alike, later versions tend to show more and more similarities. A comparison of the two formalisms has been a topic of interest in recent years.
In 20] Situation Calculus has been compared with the original Event Calculus. Several problems of the original Event Calculus | caused in particular by the notion of time intervals and by the use of predicate completion on all predicates | were pointed out, and Situation Calculus was extended with an Event Calculus-like time line running through a set of actual situations, adding a previously absent notion of real time to Situation Calculus.
In 14] Situation Calculus is compared with a more recent, simpli ed version of Event Calculus which does not su er from the aforementioned problems of the original Calculus. The similarities of the Situation Calculus and the Event Calculus are highlighted by showing that their frame axioms are equivalent under a number of conditions.
In this paper we make a more detailed analysis of the relation between Situation calculus and Event Calculus. We address a number of important issues that were left unanswered in 14] . In particular, we study the assumptions made in that paper to obtain the equivalence result. We argue that though Situation Calculus and Event Calculus are indeed very similar, that is not the end of the story. Some of the di erences between the calculi are only of a syntactic nature, but others require careful consideration as they have some important implications for knowledge representation and reasoning.
For example, in 14] some extra restrictions are imposed on Situation Calculus. This makes certain forms of reasoning | in particular counterfactual reasoning about action occurrences | in the restricted version impossible that are possible in the original Situation Calculus. As a result, where a translation of descriptions in the language A ( 11] ) into Situation Calculus has been proved sound and complete in 7] , such a translation into the restricted form of Situation Calculus of 14] is no longer possible. This problem is related to the fact that a translation of A descriptions into Event Calculus is also impossible.
We therefore propose a general formalism which extends both Situation Calculus and Event Calculus. We establish a clear relation between time points and situations | di erent from the one in 14] | and prove that assuming this relation, both original calculi can be seen as instances of the more general calculus. This shows that the new calculus has all the expressive power of Situation Calculus as well as of Event Calculus. We use this new calculus as a tool for analysing the possibilities and restrictions of both original calculi.
Studying the problem of counterfactual reasoning in more detail, we observe that not only Event Calculus, but Situation Calculus as well falls short in some cases, in particular when actions with nondeterministic e ects are present. This is due to restrictions inherent in the data structure used in Situation Calculus. We show how the new calculus can handle these cases of counterfactual reasoning that neither of the original calculi can handle. For ease of comparison we consider Open Logic Programming ( 6] ) formalisations of the two calculi. For Event Calculus, the Logic Programming formalisation is the historical one. Situation Calculus is more often expressed in classical logic, but can also be written as an (open) logic program under a suitable completion semantics. Methods similar to predicate completion have also been used in classical logic formulations of Situation Calculus, for example in 21] .
Note that the theories we consider are language-independent: under Console completion semantics ( 4] ) an open logic program is equivalent to a rst order logic theory. In fact, the proofs in this paper are all performed in classical logic, based on the Console completion of the presented open logic programs.
In section 2, we brie y describe Open Logic Programming, Situation Calculus and Event Calculus. Section 3 motivates a detailed comparison of the calculi by pointing out an important point of di erence and showing where previous equivalence results fall short. In section 4 we present the new general calculus and illustrate its use with an application. Section 5 formally relates the new calculus to the original ones. In section 6 then, we point out a problem with nondeterministic actions in Situation Calculus and show how the new calculus handles them. We conclude the paper in section 7 with a number of additional issues and some nal remarks.
A short version of this paper appeared as 30] . In this extended version we include a detailed proof of the main theorem (theorem 5.1), and discuss most issues in more detail. We also add an in-depth discussion of the issue of counterfactual reasoning in the presence of nondeterministic actions. Finally we provide more comparisons with other work. Any free variables are assumed to be universally quanti ed at the beginning of the formula. 2. Add Clark's Free Equality axioms ( 3] ) to the theory. 3. To this theory, add all formulae in C. In the sequel, also in FOL formulae we assume free variables to be universally quanti ed at the beginning of the formula.
As indicated in the introduction, proofs in this paper will be based on the FOL theory obtained by completing the open logic program.
The Situation Calculus
In this section we present an Open Logic Programming formalisation of the Situation Calculus. The basic concepts of the Situation Calculus are situations and actions. A situation is de ned as a period of time during which there are no actions, no changes in uent values (the world remains in the same state throughout a situation). Actions are the cause of state transitions: if an action A occurs in a situation S, a new situation result(A; S) begins immediately after the action. holds(P; S) means that uent P is true in situation S. initiates(A; S; P) (terminates(A; S; P)) denotes that if action A occurs in situation S, this initiates (terminates) the uent P, i.e. immediately after A the uent is true (false).
The frame axiom of the Situation Calculus can then be written down in the following de nition of holds:
holds(P; s 0 ) initially(P):
holds(P; result(A; S)) initiates(A; S; P):
holds(P; result(A; S)) holds(P; S); :terminates(A; S; P):
The completed de nition reads as follows under Console completion semantics: a uent P holds in s 0 if it is initially true, and it holds in a later situation result(A; S) either if the action A leading to that situation initiated P, or if P already held in the previous situation S and was not terminated by the most recent action. Otherwise, the uent does not hold.
A Situation Calculus description in general consists of the above clauses plus a number of domain dependent clauses de ning initially, initiates and terminates.
These de nitions are also completed. If it is not completely known, the initially predicate may be left unde ned instead. Any number of FOL formulae can be added to the theory.
In for example 22] and 20] a second order induction axiom on situations is added to the Situation Calculus. The axiom represents that the situations that can be reached from the initial situation by executing a nite sequence of actions are the only situations that exist. Under a stronger semantics for open logic programs than Console completion, for example under justi cation semantics ( 5] ), a similar axiom 1 is implied by the following clauses de ning situations: situation(s 0 ): situation(result(A; S)) situation(S); action(A): assuming a domain dependent type predicate action=1 for actions.
As Console completion semantics is more commonly used and provides an immediate mapping to FOL, which facilitates theorem proving, we do not use justi cation semantics in this paper. We instead complete the above de nition for situations and represent the induction axiom explicitly by the following second order logic formula:
Formulations of the Situation Calculus in classical logic often use one predicate abnormal instead of initiates and terminates, not distinguishing positive changes in truth value from negative ones ( 2] , 17]). Since this distinction is explicit in Event Calculus, we make it explicit in Situation Calculus as well to facilitate comparison. Moreover, as indicated in 14], such distinction results in a more detailed and therefore more \meaningful" theory.
Note that many other versions of the Situation Calculus have been used in the literature ( 17] 
The Event Calculus
The world view adopted in Event Calculus di ers in some respects from that of the Situation Calculus. In Event Calculus one considers one real line of time points. Fluents can hold or not hold at a certain time point. We use a type predicate time=1 for time points: time(T) means T is a time point. The formula holds(P; T) represents that P holds at time T. An event is the occurrence of an action at a certain point in time. The occurrence of an event E at time T is denoted by happens(E; T). The predicate happens=2 can be seen as a type predicate for events. An event can initiate or terminate uents, depending on the action associated with the event.
initiates(E; P) (terminates(E; P)) means that event E initiates (terminates) the uent P. The atom act(E; A) denotes that E consists of an occurrence of action A.
The frame axiom in Event Calculus looks as follows: holds(P; T)
happens(E 1 ; T 1 ); T 1 < T; initiates(E 1 ; P);
:clipped(T 1 ; P; T):
clipped(T 1 ; P; T) happens(E 2 ; T 2 ); T 1 < T 2 ; T 2 < T; terminates(E 2 ; P): The meaning of an Event Calculus program is given by the Console completion of a logic program which consists of the above clauses plus a set of program clauses de ning initiates, terminates, happens, act and <. initiates and terminates usually have domain dependent de nitions in terms of act. happens, act and < are usually de ned by enumeration, asserting a speci c scenario in the problem domain. Alternatively, instead of giving a de nition for happens, act and <, these basic concepts may be left unde ned if the scenario is not given. In all cases, any FOL axioms can be added to the theory.
At the beginning of time, say at t 0 , there is a start event initiating all uents that are initially true. This is represented by including the following clauses in the de nition of the predicates time, happens and initiates: time(t 0 ): happens(start; t 0 ): initiates(start; P) initially(P): If happens is unde ned (e.g. not completely known), the happens fact above is replaced by a FOL axiom happens(start; t 0 ). time(t 0 ) is handled in a similar way if time is unde ned. The new predicate initially which occurs in the de nition of initiates can either be de ned by a set of facts, or left unde ned. No events are allowed to occur before t 0 :
happens(E; T) ) ((t 0 < T) _ (E = start)) Note that the initial event can actually be omitted, creating a time line which is unbounded in past and future. In most applications however, an initial \state of the world" is a very useful concept.
In Event Calculus, the order on time points must be a linear order, so the following axioms need to be satis ed for all T 1 , T 2 and T 3 :
The last axiom indicates that < can only relate time points.
It has been indicated before, for example in 18] and 8], that not restricting time to a linear order leads to certain problems in Event Calculus. Partial orders can give rise to undesired models by allowing events to be unrelated in time. This is especially a problem if actions have context-dependent e ects.
A small example, taken from 8], illustrates this: assume we have a light which can be on or o (indicated by the truth or falsity of the uent on). The light can be turned on or o by a switch event. This is modeled by initiates(E; on) act(E; switch); happens(E; T); :holds(on; T):
terminates(E; on) act(E; switch); happens(E; T); holds(on; T):
Then assume the light is initially o (we have an empty de nition for initially), and there are two non-simultaneous switch events.
happens(e 1 ; t 1 ): act(e 1 ; switch): happens(e 2 ; t 2 ): act(e 2 ; switch): We do not know which switch event occurs rst. In any case, we expect the light to be o at any time T later than both events:
8T : (t 1 < T) & (t 2 < T)] ) :holds(on; T) should be entailed. Indeed, we expect the rst event (whichever it is) to initiate on and the second event to terminate it again. However, without the linear order constraint, it is possible that neither t 1 < t 2 nor t 2 < t 1 holds. In that case, both events initiate on as it is still false at t 1 as well as at t 2 . This leads to the erroneous conclusion that at a time point T after t 1 and t 2 , holds(on; T) is true.
Note that the restriction to linear order does not imply that the order must be completely known: in each model every pair of di erent time points must be ordered in one way or the other, but in which way is not necessarily xed.
Another requirement we impose | mainly for reasons of simplicity | is that no more than one event can occur at one point in time. Also, each event can of course only happen once:
Like in Situation Calculus, we introduce a domain dependent predicate action=1, and we impose the constraint act(E; A) ) action(A)
We also assume there is at most one action associated with each event:
This axiom can be omitted to allow for simultaneous actions under certain circumstances, but for our comparison with Situation Calculus we can exclude these altogether. Note also that we assume actions to be instantaneous, here as well as in Situation Calculus. Actions with a non-zero duration are not considered in this paper.
This version of the Event Calculus is of course not the only one used in the literature. The Event Calculus has changed considerably since its original presentation in 16] , and a number of simpli cations led to several formulations ( 9] 24] , it is worth observing that our variant is not closest to the Simpli ed Event Calculus described there, but rather nearly equivalent to the New Event Calculus as described in that paper. This is due to our formulation of Event Calculus as an open logic program with FOL axioms instead of a classical logic program. As a result, our variant has all the advantages of New Event Calculus described in 24].
An example problem domain
For our examples in this paper, we will use the simple and well-known problem domain of the Yale Shooting Problem. The important uents in this domain are loaded, indicating that a gun is loaded, and alive, indicating that a turkey is alive. Basic actions are load (with the e ect that the gun becomes loaded), wait (which has no e ect), and shoot (which unloads the gun and kills the turkey if the gun was loaded). The action predicate is then de ned as action(A) , ( initiates(E; loaded) act(E; load): terminates(E; loaded) act(E; shoot): terminates(E; alive)
act(E; shoot); happens(E; T); holds(loaded; T): We will use examples in this problem domain throughout the paper to illustrate and clarify our results.
COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING IN SITUATION CALCULUS AND EVENT CALCULUS
As indicated before, in 14] slightly modi ed versions of Situation Calculus and Event Calculus were shown to be equivalent. The main motivation for our research on this topic then was an unexpected problem arising during an attempt to provide a transformation from temporal domain descriptions in the A language ( 11] ) to (Open) Event Calculus theories. Where a transformation of A to (Open) Situation Calculus was established and proved sound and complete in 7], our proposed transformation to Event Calculus was incorrect. A detailed analysis pointed out that the problem could not be xed by modifying the transformation, but was actually inherent to the Event Calculus, and in particular to its linear time structure. Evidently then, the question arose how this relates to the equivalence result in 14]. We rst illustrate the problem. It concerns the representation of counterfactual statements of the form \If A had happened, then B would have held". Such statements can be correctly represented in theories with a branching time structure, where one can simultaneously talk about several possible evolutions of the world.
Examples of such theories are A and Situation Calculus.
At rst sight, counterfactuals can be handled equally well using a form of abductive reasoning in a linear time theory, but this intuition is apparently not true. We clarify the point with an example.
Assume we initially have a living turkey, and there is no information on the initial state of the gun. In this situation, a shoot event occurs. We also know that, if instead of shooting we had simply waited, the gun would have been loaded afterward. The question is then: can the turkey be alive after the shoot event ?
The intended answer is no: indeed, since we know that the gun would have been loaded if we had waited instead of shooting, we can conclude that it must have been loaded before the wait event (in the initial situation), since waiting can not have loaded the gun. Therefore, shooting in the initial situation must have killed the turkey.
An open logic programming representation of this problem in Situation Calculus looks as follows. The initial situation is described by the predicate initially. This predicate is unde ned here as we have no complete information on it. However, there is partial information represented by the FOL axiom initially(alive) We represent the knowledge about the counterfactual situation by a FOL axiom holds(loaded; result(wait; s 0 )): This axiom, though expressed in terms of the holds predicate, actually constrains the possible values of the unde ned initially predicate. Indeed, the open logic program without the FOL axiom has two models: one in which initially(loaded) is true and one in which it is false. In the latter model, we can derive :holds(loaded; s 0 ), and therefore :holds(loaded; result(wait; s 0 )). This is inconsistent with the FOL axiom, so this model of the program clauses is not a model of our theory. The only valid model is the one in which initially(loaded) is true. In that model, we nd holds(loaded; s 0 ), from which we can obtain the intended result :holds(alive; result(shoot; s 0 )): using the clauses for termination of uents.
In Event Calculus, the representation which springs to mind is the following: since we want to reason about di erent sequences of events, we assume incomplete knowledge on events and their order. We declare happens and act as well as < unde ned. Representing knowledge about a counterfactual situation is done in a way very similar to that in Situation Calculus, by using an axiom of the form \if this sequence of events happens, then this formula will hold afterward". To simplify notation, we rst de ne a new predicate int events=2. and we can express our query as (happens(e 2 ; t 2 ) & act(e 2 ; shoot) & :int events(t 0 ; t 2 )) ) 8T : (t 2 < T & :int events(t 2 ; T)) ) holds(alive; T)) Sadly enough, this is not a correct representation. Indeed, due to the linear time constraint in Event Calculus, the lefthandside of the axiom and the lefthandside of the query can never evaluate to true in the same interpretation. Either e 2 can follow start without intermediate events, or e 1 can, but not both. Therefore, our axiom has no in uence on any useful answers to our query (answers in which the query's lefthandside is true), where it should have provided us with extra information. In fact, we have not been able to model the counterfactual statement if we had waited, the gun would have been loaded, but have only (and insu ciently) approximated it modeling if we have waited, the gun was loaded afterward.
This boils down to the following: for each sequence of events, our theory has at least one model in which that sequence occurs. However, within one model, only one sequence of events can exist. Combining information about two unrelated sequences of events is not possible within the formalism, because one sequence always excludes the other.
It should be mentioned that using meta-reasoning on the formalism we should be able to reach the desired conclusions. This is due to the fact that meta-reasoning allows one to consider di erent object-level models in one meta-level model. As a result, if we restrict time to a linear order we can still perform counterfactual reasoning by reasoning on the formalism, but we can not model counterfactual reasoning within the formalism.
Using branching time like in Situation Calculus, on the other hand, we nd all di erent sequences (branches) of events in one model. This allows us to combine information about these branches, and therefore to perform counterfactual reasoning within the formalism.
We conclude that for counterfactual reasoning on the sequence of occurring actions it is not su cient that a model exists for each considered sequence: we need all di erent sequences in the same model if we want to reason on how they relate to each other within the formalism. One way to achieve this is a branching time structure like in Situation Calculus. The use of abductive reasoning on a theory like Event Calculus with one time line in each model is not an adequate alternative.
The previous example shows that Situation Calculus can be used to model problems that Event Calculus can not handle. This is apparently in contradiction with the equivalence result in 14], which is surprising and requires an explanation.
The reason for the paradoxical results lies in the modi cations applied to Situation Calculus in 14] to prove the equivalence with Event Calculus. To the frame axiom of Situation Calculus, \happens(A,S)" atoms are added, resulting in the axiom holds(P; result(A; S)) happens(A; S); initiates(A; S; P):
holds(P; result(A; S)) happens(A; S); holds(P; S); :terminates(A; S; P):
In short, the modi ed Situation Calculus is indeed equivalent to the Event Calculus under the appropriate assumptions, but it is strictly less expressive than the original Situation Calculus. Our goal in this paper is to slightly extend the Event Calculus and then to establish an equivalence between the calculi without losing any functionality (and actually while gaining some).
Another di erence between our approach and the one in 14] lies in the relation between time points and situations. In 14] situations are assumed to correspond to one time point. We take a di erent approach, considering a situation to be a set of time points, more speci cally a set of time points between two actions, like in 20]. This point of view ts in more naturally with the concept of instantaneous actions, which we have adopted earlier.
A GENERALIZED CALCULUS
We now present a new calculus which extends both Situation Calculus and Event Calculus. Basically, we start with Event Calculus and extend it with branching time. After that, we will de ne situations and relate the new calculus to Situation Calculus.
The New Calculus
In our new calculus, event(E; T) indicates the occurrence of event E at the hypothetical time point T. The distinction between event=2 and the happens=2 predicate of Event Calculus is related to the branching time aspect we introduce here. holds(P; T) means P holds at T. initially, initiates, terminates, act, time and < have the same meaning as in Event Calculus.
The frame axiom is identical to the Event Calculus axiom with happens=2 renamed to event=2 : holds(P; T) event(E 1 ; T 1 ); T 1 < T; initiates(E 1 ; P);
clipped(T 1 ; P; T) event(E 2 ; T 2 ); T 1 < T 2 ; T 2 < T; terminates(E 2 ; P): The di erence with Event Calculus lies in the time structure: instead of the linear time constraints of Event Calculus, we introduce weaker constraints ensuring a branching time structure.
:
Like in Event Calculus, events correspond to exactly one time point and time points to at most one event. We assume a type predicate for actions action=1, which is domain dependent. We impose that at least one action exists. Like in Event Calculus, we also exlude simultaneous actions.
We introduce an initial event at t 0 : time(t 0 ) event(start; t 0 ) event(E; T) ) ((t 0 < T) _ (E = start)) and relate initially to initiates by including the following clause in the de nition of initiates:
initiates(start; P) initially(P): Finally, we often need a notion of presence or absence of intermediate events between two events. We de ne the predicate int events as follows:
The meaning of our theory is given by the FOL theory obtained as follows: we take all clauses in this section, add to them de nitions in the form of clauses for initially, initiates (partially given in terms of initially above), terminates, event, <, act and time (and any predicates occurring in these clauses), and complete the resulting program using Console Completion. Some of these predicates (any except initiates and terminates) may be declared unde ned instead. All FOL axioms are added to the resulting theory.
Application
We illustrate how we can use the new formalism to represent the counterfactual reasoning problem we encountered earlier, and which we failed to model in Event Calculus.
To summarize the example again: initially there is a living turkey and a gun which may or may not be loaded. Then, a shoot event occurs. We know that, if we had waited instead of shooting, the gun would have been loaded afterward. Question is if the turkey can be alive after the shooting (it should not).
As before, initially is unde ned. One FOL axiom describes our knowledge on the initial state of the world:
initially(alive) We assume incomplete knowledge on the existing time points (time is unde ned). Evidently then < is unde ned as well, and we express our knowledge on < by FOL constraints. We do, however, for the sake of simplicity, assume complete knowledge of all (real or counterfactual) relevant events and actions, so we can de ne these by enumeration. The following facts assert the existence of the events we want to reason on.
event(e 1 ; t 1 ): act(e 1 ; shoot): event(e 2 ; t 2 ): act(e 2 ; wait): These events occur in mutually exclusive evolutions of the world, so they are on two di erent branches in the time structure. The axioms time(t 1 ) time(t 2 )
:(t 1 < t 2 ) :(t 2 < t 1 ) represent this knowledge.
Observations about hypothetical evolutions of the world are in general represented by FOL axioms. In this case we get the axiom 8T : ((t 2 < T)&:int events(t 2 ; T) ) holds(loaded; T))
As we can check, this axiom is only satis ed in models in which initially(loaded) is true. In those models, holds(loaded; t 1 ) is true, which implies terminates(e 1 ; alive). Therefore, 8T : ((t 1 < T)&:int events(t 1 ; T) ) :holds(alive; T)) holds in all models of our theory, which is the intended result.
This application shows that the above form of counterfactual reasoning is possible in the new formalism, where it is not in Event Calculus. The addition of branching time is responsible for the gain in expressivity.
Note, by the way, that the modi cation of the time constraints to model a branching time structure instead of a line does not endanger the correctness of the formalism. The problems illustrated with the light switch example in section 2 are avoided, because while time points are now allowed to be unrelated (in di erent branches), the constraints ensure that the branches do not merge again. In other words, even though not all time points are linearly ordered, for each time point all earlier time points are linearly ordered.
Introducing Situations
The open logic program in section 4.1 forms the essence of our new calculus. Now we extend this theory with a number of additional concepts that correspond to the concepts in Situation Calculus.
First of all, we introduce situations. We de ne a situation to be the set of all time points that are later than a certain event (the starting event of the situation), and such that there are no other events between the starting event and the time point itself. We call the initial situation s 0 , and use the term result(E; A; S) to denote the situation which is started by the event E with associated action A occurring in situation S. Note that A and S are uniquely determined by E, but not vice versa. For our discussion it is appropriate to include all three parameters in the situation name, as we do here.
Informally, we get the following inductive de nition: We can then inductively de ne a type predicate for situations : s 0 is a situation, and S = result(E; A; S 0 ) is a situation if S 0 is a situation, E an event occurring at a time point belonging to S 0 and A the action associated with that event.
situation(s 0 ): situation(result(E; A; S 0 )) situation(S 0 ); action(A); member(T; S 0 ); event(E; T); act(E; A): As before, the FOL theory corresponding to these de nitions is obtained by taking their completion.
Having introduced situations, we de ne what it means for a uent to hold in a situation: we say that a uent holds in a situation if and only if it holds at all time points belonging to that situation. We use the predicate holds in=2 to express the truth value of uents in a situation.
holds in(P; S) , 8T : (member(T; S) ) holds(P; T)) It is crucial to note here that to check if a uent holds in a situation, it is not necessary to check all time points in the situation (which might well be impossible). Indeed, we can prove that a uent holds at all time points in a situation if it holds at at least one. This is expressed in the following theorem: We now use the knowledge that T 0 < T and T < T. Given our FOL axioms on the time relation this implies that either T 0 < T or T 0 = T must hold (T < T 0 can not hold because of :int events(T ; T)):
9T; E 0 ; T 0 ; E ; T ; A; S :
(S = result(E ; A; S ) & T < T & member(T ; S ) & :int events(T ; T) & event(E ; T ) & act(E ; A) & event(E 0 ; T 0 ) & T 0 < T & initiates(E 0 ; P) & :clipped(T 0 ; P; T))] _ 9T; E ; T ; A; S : (S = result(E ; A; S ) & T < T & :int events(T ; T) & member(T ; S ) & event(E ; T ) & act(E ; A) & initiates(E ; P) & :clipped(T ; P; T))]
Now, what we must prove is that for each member of S, P holds. So assume member(T + ; S). We add member(T + ; S) to both disjuncts:
(S = result(E ; A; S ) & T < T & member(T ; S ) & :int events(T ; T) & event(E ; T ) & act(E ; A) & event(E 0 ; T 0 ) & T 0 < T & initiates(E 0 ; P) & :clipped(T 0 ; P; T)) & member(T + ; S)] _ 9T; E ; T ; A; S : (S = result(E ; A; S ) & T < T & :int events(T ; T) & member(T ; S ) & event(E ; T ) & act(E ; A) & initiates(E ; P) & :clipped(T ; P; T)) & member(T + ; S)]
and rewrite them using the de nition of member 9T; E 0 ; T 0 ; E ; T ; A; S ; T 00 : As events can only be associated with one time point, T 00 = T must hold, so we can simplify the formula (also omitting some conjuncts) to 9T; E 0 ; T 0 ; E ; T :
(S = result(E ; A; S ) & T < T & member(T ; S ) & :int events(T ; T) & event(E ; T ) & act(E ;
A
(event(E ; T ) & member(T ; S ) & act(E ; A) & T < T + & :int events(T ; T + ) & T < T & :int events(T ; T) & event(E 0 ; T 0 ) & T 0 < T & initiates(E 0 ; P) & :clipped(T 0 ; P; T))] _ 9T; E ; T : (event(E ; T ) & member(T ; S ) & act(E ; A) & T < T + & :int events(T ; T + ) & T < T & :int events(T ; T) & initiates(E ; P) & :clipped(T ; P; T))]
Now, in the rst disjunct we can expand the de nition of clipped=3: given T 0 < T , Which leads, in both disjuncts, to the conclusion that holds(P; T + ) which proves the theorem for the case S = result(E ; A; S ). Together with the proof for S = s 0 above, this completes the proof of the theorem. 2 This representation shows greater similarities with the one in Situation Calculus, and is de nitely less cumbersome.
T < T and event(E ; T ), :clipped(T 0 ; P; T) is equivalent

The application revisited
RELATION TO THE ORIGINAL CALCULI
As indicated before, the new calculus can be seen as an extension of both Situation Calculus and Event Calculus. We can obtain Situation Calculus or Event Calculus by adding speci c constraints to the general calculus, as we prove in this section. Evidently, these speci c constraints represent the essential di erence between Situation Calculus and Event Calculus, and we will further study some of their implications later in the paper.
First, we show that Event Calculus is a special case of the new calculus as described in section 4.1. The only actual di erence between the calculi | if we rename the event predicate to happens or vice versa, which is only a matter of syntax | is in the constraints on <.
In Event Calculus, we have an axiom
where the corresponding axiom in the new calculus reads
) As either calculus contains an axiom (T 1 < T 2 ) ) (time(T 1 ) & time(T 2 )), the lefthandside of (1) is implied by the lefthandside of (2), while their righthandsides are the same. Therefore, (2) is implied by (1): the Event Calculus axiom is strictly stronger than the new axiom. Intuitively, this corresponds to the fact that a time line is one special case of a branching time structure.
So, to obtain Event Calculus, we only need to strengthen one axiom of our calculus, restricting the time tree to a line.
We now show the relation of the new calculus to Situation Calculus. This is less straightforward than the relation to Event Calculus, partly because the frame axiom is formulated in a di erent way, but also because a number of assumptions in Situation Calculus are implicit in the data structure. These assumptions have to be made explicit in the new calculus, which will also result in a clearer view on them.
First of all, we introduce the concepts described in section 4.3, adding the clauses and axioms of that section to those in section 4.1.
A very important assumption inherent to Situation Calculus is the following. In Situation Calculus, each term result(A; S 0 ) where A is an action and S 0 is a situation, represents a new situation. All of these terms exist in the theory and therefore all of these situations are implicitly present in Situation Calculus. Moreover, for each action A and situation S 0 , there is exactly one resulting situation result(A; S 0 ).
In other words, in Situation Calculus it is assumed that in each (hypothetical) situation each action occurs (in some hypothetical evolution of the world), and leads to exactly one new situation. Note that this is not necessarily true in our new calculus and requires an extra axiom. Since we have de ned a situation as the set of time points after a certain event and before any other later events, in our new calculus this assumption reads that for each event E and action A, there is exactly one event E consisting of the occurrence of A immediately after E. Applying axiom (ib) to either part of the disjunction, we nd E = E 0 which proves the lemma. 2 This lemma also implies that to each (action; situation) pair there corresponds exactly one event consisting of that action occurring in that situation. A situation is then completely determined by the previous situation and the last action. Therefore, we can eliminate the event parameter in situation names and reduce the term result(E; A; S) to result(A; S). Our names for situations then coincide with those of Situation Calculus.
8E; T; A : ((event(E; T) & action(A)) ) 9E ; T : (ia) event(E ; T ) & (T < T ) & act(E ; A) & :int events(T; T )]
Like in Situation Calculus, we want to state that the situations reachable from the initial situation by executing a nite number of actions are the only situations that exist. This is expressed by the induction axiom
: (8S : (situation(S) ) (S))) ( ( (s 0 ) & 8A; S : ( (S) & action(A) & situation(S)) ) (result(A; S))])]
One more thing we have to do before we can actually prove an equivalence of the frame axioms of Situation Calculus and the new calculus, is de ning the concepts corresponding to the Situation Calculus predicates initiates=3 and terminates=3 in the new calculus. These predicates indicate when an action executed in a certain situation initiates or terminates a uent. In terms of events the de nitions read as follows (choosing new names init s=3 and term s=3 to avoid confusion with initiates=2 and terminates=2 for events):
8A; S; P : (init s(A; S; P) , 9E; T :
(member(T; S) & event(E; T) & act(E; A) & initiates(E; P)))
8A; S; P : (term s(A; S; P) , 9E; T : (member(T; S) & event(E; T) & act(E; A) & terminates(E; P)))
With all the necessary concepts de ned, we can now state our equivalence result. Intuitively, this result states that the predicate holds in, de ning the truth value of a uent in a situation, coincides with the predicate holds 0 de ned in terms of init s and term s by the Situation Calculus frame axiom as follows:
holds 0 (P; s 0 ) initially(P): holds 0 (P; result(A; S)) init s(A; S; P): T j = 8P; S : situation(S) ) (holds in(P; S) , holds 0 (P; S)) To prove this theorem, we rst prove a lemma which extends theorem 4.1:
8S : situation(S) ) ( 9T : member(T; S) & holds(P; T)] , 8T : member(T; S) ) holds(P; T)])
Proof. The \) part" is theorem 4.1. The proof of the \( part" is straightforward: all that needs to be proved for all S is 9T : member(T; S), which follows immediately from lemma 5.1.a and the axiom that at least one action exists. 2 We now proceed with the proof of theorem 5.1. Proof. The proof of our theorem is by induction on situations. Using the induction axiom on situations we nd that the theorem follows from the formulae 8P : holds 0 (P; s 0 ) , holds in(P; s 0 ) 8P; A; S : (situation(S) & action(A)) ) (holds 0 (P; S) , holds in(P; S)) ) (holds 0 (P; result(A; S)) , holds in(P; result(A; S))]
which we prove here. The rst formula (the base case) can be proved as follows: using the de nition of holds in, we write holds in(P; s 0 ) as 8T : (t 0 < T & :int events(t 0 ; T)) ) holds(P; T)] and using the de nition of holds this is equivalent to initiates(start; P) implies the above formula, as :clipped(t 0 ; P; T) trivially follows from :int events(t 0 ; T).
So we nd that holds in(P; s 0 ) , initiates(start; P). Of course, we also know that initiates(start; P) is equivalent to initially(P) and therefore to holds 0 (P; s 0 ). This completes the proof of the base case. The proof of the induction step is rather tedious. We state the result here as a new lemma: Lemma 5.3. T j = 8P; A; S : situation(S) & action(A)] ) (holds 0 (P; S) , holds in(P; S)) ) (holds 0 (P; result(A; S)) , holds in(P; result(A; S))]
We refer the reader to the appendix for the details of the proof of this lemma. Given the base case proved above and lemma 5.3, our theorem now follows directly from the induction axiom. This completes the proof that the predicate holds 0 =2 de ned by the Situation Calculus frame axiom coincides with holds in=2 de ned in terms of the holds predicate for time points in our new calculus. 2 
RESTRICTIONS OF SITUATION CALCULUS FOR COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING
As we argued in section 5, the key reason for the success of Situation Calculus | compared to Event Calculus| at counterfactual reasoning was that in each model of a Situation Calculus theory, all relevant real and counterfactual situations were present. On the logical level, the existence of the necessary situations in Situation Calculus is ensured by : 1. the use of the functor result=2 to encode situations, combined with the fact that in classical logic a functor represents a total mapping, as stated explicitly by the tautology 8A; S 1 : 9S 2 : result(A; S 1 ) = S 2 . Our de nition of the type predicate situation=1 ensures that S 2 is a situation if A is an action and S 1 a situation. 2. the presence of Clark's equality theory, which entails that di erent situation terms represent di erent situations. In this section, we further illuminate this key point for counterfactual reasoning. We do this by introducing a class of temporal domains and showing that representations of these domains in Situation Calculus do not allow to derive intended conclusions based on counterfactual information. The reason for this will be shown to be that for these domains, also in Situation Calculus, not all relevant counterfactual situations are present in each model.
The class of temporal domains under scrutiny makes use of nondeterministic actions: actions which, when executed in one and the same situation, may have di erent e ects and hence can lead to di erent resulting states.
There are several di erent ways in which nondeterministic actions can arise in a temporal domain. The modeled action may be truly nondeterministic like the radioactive decay of particles, or it may be deterministic but dependent on very small di erences in the world or in the way the action is performed, di erences which are not modeled in the theory. In some cases, for example when representing the action of rolling a die, these di erences can not be reasonably modeled. In other cases the domain may be modeled at a high level of abstraction, on which the di erences that in uence the action are not visible. In the latter case the nondeterminism can be eliminated by using a lower, more detailed, level of abstraction.
We start with an example illustrating the representation of nondeterministic actions in Situation Calculus.
Assume a variant of the Yale shooting problem where the shoot action has a nondeterministic e ect: sometimes the bullet only wounds the turkey and does not kill it (for example because the hunter has waited a split second longer, the gun has been aimed a little di erently, the turkey has moved slightly or for some other reason we do not know). If we perform shoot in a situation in which both alive and loaded hold, two resulting situations are possible: one in which alive holds (and wounded as well), and one in which it does not.
The e ect of shooting could in this case be modeled by the formula A representation which ts better into our formalism and which allows for the use of standard completion, can be obtained from the above one by introducing an unde ned \degree of freedom" predicate. The use of degree of freedom predicates for representing nondeterminism was originally proposed in 8] in the context of Event Calculus. In general speci cations of the above type using disjunctions can be transformed rather easily into OLP speci cations with degree of freedom predicates. We illustrate the method by modeling the above problem domain in OLP. The rules for initiation and termination read:
initiates ( where luck=2 is an unde ned predicate indicating whether or not the hunter is lucky during a particular instance | determined here by the situation in which it occurs | of the shoot action (i.e. whether his shot kills the turkey or not).
The actual outcome of the nondeterministic action (i.e. the choice of disjunct in the original e ect axiom) depends on this unde ned predicate, on which we have no information. The theory does not entail or exclude either outcome.
Note that the truth value of the unde ned predicate is not dependent on the state of the world at the action's time of occurrence: the predicate should be considered to represent an unknown modi er of the nondeterministic action. It is not a uent. This is slightly more apparent in the Event Calculus/new calculus representation:
initiates(E; loaded) act(E; load): terminates(E; loaded) act(E; shoot): terminates(E; alive)
act(E; shoot); event(E; T); holds(loaded; T); holds(alive; T); luck(E): initiates(E; wounded) act(E; shoot); event(E; T); holds(loaded; T); holds(alive; T); :luck(E):
where luck=1 is an unde ned predicate parameterized with the event it refers to. In the Situation Calculus representation the (action; situation) pair is the equivalent of this event.
The following scenario illustrates some forms of reasoning with nondeterministic actions in Situation Calculus. Given a turkey which is initially alive and a gun which is initially loaded, as represented by initially(alive): initially(loaded): we want to determine whether the turkey is alive or not after shooting, so if holds(alive; result(shoot; s 0 )) or its negation are entailed. The only unde ned predicate is luck=2, as explained above.
Because luck=2 is unde ned, the theory has models in which luck(shoot; s 0 ) is true as well as models in which it is false. In the former set of models, the formula holds(alive; result(shoot; s 0 )) is false, in the latter it is true. Therefore, as intended, neither this formula nor its negation are entailed.
Independent observations may give additional information on a certain scenario. If in the scenario above we had observed that the turkey was dead after we had reloaded the gun, i.e. if :holds(alive; result(load; result(shoot; s 0 ))) was an additional FOL axiom, the new theory would entail luck(shoot; s 0 ) and therefore :holds(alive; result(shoot; s 0 )).
This brie y illustrates that Situation Calculus is capable of certain forms of reasoning with nondeterministic actions.
However, problems arise when on these nondeterministic actions counterfactual reasoning is performed. The reason for this is that Situation Calculus can not in general represent all relevant situations resulting from a nondeterministic action.
The following scenario illustrates this: we shoot a turkey, which is initially alive, with a gun that may or may not be loaded. We have the additional information that the outcome of shooting could have been that the turkey died. Note that no matter whether the gun was loaded or not, the turkey could still be alive after shooting, due to the nondeterminism involved in that action. The information that the turkey could be dead as well entails that the gun was initially loaded.
We can represent the scenario in Situation Calculus as follows. The initially predicate is unde ned, and one FOL axiom about it is given: initially(alive) The luck predicate is unde ned as well. The information about the counterfactual outcome of shooting is represented by the axiom :holds(alive; result(shoot; s 0 )) which entails initially(loaded), as intended. However, it also trivially entails the falsity of holds(alive; result(shoot; s 0 )) So in Situation Calculus, we reach the unintended conclusion that the turkey would always be dead after shooting.
In a theory correctly representing the above scenario, it is required that more than one situation resulting from a shoot action in the initial situation is present in one model. This problem can not be solved in Situation Calculus, although it can arguably be sidestepped by replacing the shoot action type by two di erent (deterministic) action types, for example shoot and kill and shoot and wound. The nondeterminism is then eliminated, which evidently avoids the problem sketched above.
As opposed to Situation Calculus, the new calculus allows for a direct representation of nondeterministic actions and for counterfactual reasoning on them. This is due to the fact that the new calculus allows multiple situations to result from the same sequence of actions in the same model. If we can enforce the existence of these di erent situations, counterfactual reasoning is no longer a problem.
The existence of all possible situations can be guaranteed by FOL axioms. If only deterministic actions are present, axiom (ia) of section 5 or Lemma 5.1.a which is derived from it, are su cient. In terms of situations, this axiom can also be written as 8S; A : (situation(S) & action(A)) ) 9E : situation(result(E; A; S)) When nondeterministic actions are present, this axiom must be extended with speci c axioms ensuring that for each nondeterministic action the situation tree contains situations corresponding to all possible outcomes of that action.
As an example, we take the Yale shooting domain with nondeterministic shoot action we modeled above. The existence of all possible situations resulting from shooting can be ensured by the following axiom (note that nondeterminism only occurs when both alive and loaded hold in a situation). As an example of counterfactual reasoning on this domain, we represent the above scenario in the new calculus. Unde ned predicates are initially and luck as well as event, act and <. There is a FOL axiom on initially:
initially ( The initiation and termination rules on the other hand guarantee that for each E situation(result(E; shoot; s 0 )) & :luck(E) ) holds in(alive; result(E; shoot; s 0 )) & holds in(wounded; result(E; shoot; s 0 )) is true. Combining these formulae we conclude that the turkey can be alive after shooting. Moreover, the theory also entails that if the turkey survives the shot, it will certainly be wounded.
This example shows how the de ciency of Situation Calculus for counterfactual reasoning can be dealt with in a more general calculus, in which the time tree contains more situations.
DISCUSSION
In this paper we have presented a new calculus extending Situation Calculus and Event Calculus. We have used the new calculus as an analysis tool for comparing the original calculi.
Our approach di ers in several respects from the comparison made in 14]. First of all, in 14] the similarities of the calculi were highlighted by reducing them to a common core. Here we complement this work, by creating a calculus which extends rather than restricts both original calculi and by explicitly representing the restrictions needed to obtain either of them from the general calculus. We study the implications of these restrictions, indicating in what aspects the original calculi di er and for which types of reasoning they fall short.
Another di erence between our comparison and the one in 14] is the way in which time points are related to situations. In 14], there is a one-to-one correspondence between Situation Calculus situations and Event Calculus time points. A situation is seen as a snapshot of the world at one instant in time. However, we favour the view in for example 20] , where situations correspond to extended periods of time. Hence our de nition of situations as sets of time points.
Our approach also di ers from Pinto and Reiter's: in 20] a time line (a path of actual event occurrences) is added to Situation Calculus, running only through one \actual" sequence of situations. In our proposal we treat all situations as equal, creating a tree of (hypothetical) events and time points running through all of the situations instead of only through one sequence of them. The extra expressivity obtained by this embedding of a time line in situations (which, for example, is necessary for modeling continuously changing quantities) is thereby extended to all hypothetical situations instead of to only the actual ones. 2 As we indicated in the introduction, one of the motivations for this research was our failure to nd a sound and complete translation of A descriptions into Event
Calculus. The advantage of such a translation of high-level action languages like A into temporal reasoning formalisms, is that a more general evaluation of these formalisms is obtained than by only presenting a number of standard examples and handling them in the formalism.
Since the introduction of A, translations of that language into many formalisms However, also this problem can be dealt with rather easily. We do not go into the details in this paper.
Another issue related to this discussion on A is the following: in 13] an extension of A, called AR 0 , is introduced. This language allows to describe actions with indirect e ects and simple forms of nondeterminism. A translation of this language into a variant of Situation Calculus is given. The question arises how this relates to our observation that nondeterminism leads to problems in Situation Calculus.
Without going into the details, we observe that nondeterminism can be represented in AR 0 , like in Open Logic Programming Situation or Event Calculus, but that the forms of counterfactual reasoning described above can no longer be represented in the presence of this nondeterminism. The reason for this is the same as in Situation Calculus : it is impossible to distinguish between two sequences consisting of exactly the same actions in one model. We do not pursue the point further here. Regarding the new calculus, some other issues are of interest. For example, in certain cases (natural language processing springs to mind) it may be important to distinguish actual from hypothetical or counterfactual events. In our formalism there is no distinction between them. However, it is not hard to add such distinction. We can select one line of time points to be the actual line, for example using the predicate actual=1 to indicate actual time points. This predicate would have to satisfy the following FOL axioms for all T 1 and T 2 : actual(T 1 ) ) time(T 1 ) (actual(T 1 )&actual(T 2 )) ) (T 1 < T 2 ) _ (T 2 < T 1 ) _ (T 1 = T 2 )] actual(t 0 ) indicating that all actual time points are time points, that they form a line, and that the initial time point is actual. 3 In 23] the issue of narratives is addressed. A narrative is a course of real events about which there might be incomplete information. 4 29] for the qualitative case. The approach of Shanahan relies on calculations with real numbers, which makes it unsuited for extension to branching time structrures. The approach in 29], however, does not use any calculations on time points and therefore leaves the possibility of branching time open. This means hypothetical reasoning on continuously changing quantities becomes possible. This has not been studied in detail yet, and we do not pursue the point further here.
Throughout the paper we have stressed the importance of the existence of all relevant situations in each model for counterfactual reasoning. In particular, counterfactual reasoning on nondeterministic actions is possible when multiple situations resulting from the same action are present in a situation tree. One related issue we have not explicitly addressed is counterfactual reasoning on the initial state of the world, i.e. the representation of statements like \If the gun had not been loaded initially, the turkey would have been alive after shooting". A correct representation of such statements requires that models contain multiple \possible" initial situations.
This can be achieved in a way very similar to the one we used when dealing with nondeterministic actions: an extra parameter can be included in the initially predicate; this parameter distinguishes between several possible initial situations, just like the extra event parameter in situation names distinguishes between different resulting situations from an action. For example, initially(alive; s 2 ) would represent that alive holds in one of the initial situations, s 2 . Each initial situation then functions as the root of one tree of situations. Counterfactual reasoning can be performed by combining information on di erent possible initial situations.
Actually, we could adopt a di erent representation of the initial situation | as proposed in 14] |, assuming the initial situation is the result of a creation action which itself occurs in a (pre-initial) situation in which no uents hold. Then the above solution can be merged with the nondeterministic action solution by making creation nondeterministic. This will yield the multiple required \initial" situations for counterfactual reasoning as di erent possible outcomes of the creation action.
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Appendix: Proof of Lemma 5.3 Lemma 5.3: T j = 8P; A; S : situation(S) & action(A)] ) (holds 0 (P; S) , holds in(P; S)) ) (holds 0 (P; result(A; S)) , holds in(P; result(A; S))]
Proof. We need to prove for all A,P and S that, given situation(S) and action(A), and given holds 0 (P; S) , holds in(P; S), it follows that holds 0 (P; result(A; S)) , holds in(P; result(A; S))
To this end, we rewrite holds 0 (P; result(A; S)) and holds in(P; result(A; S)) rst. holds 0 (P; result(A; S)) is by de nition equivalent to holds We will call this formula F.
On the other hand, holds in(P; result(A; S)) is equivalent to 8T : member(T; result(A; S)) ) holds(P; T) This formula will be called G.
We need to prove that F , G. First we prove that F ) G. Assume F is given.
We can write member(T; result(A; S)) as 
